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[So F. No. 21028. In Bank.

Oct. 4,1962.)

LEON H. MAYHOOD, Plaintiff and Respondent, V.
NANETTE R. MITCHELL LA ROSA et aI., Defendants and Appellants.
[la,lb] Husband and Wife-Oommunity and Separate PropertyProdts of Business.-Where the husband acquired certain real
property before his marriage and such land was used during
the 44 years of the marriage to grow fruit trees and grape
vines, the husband devoting most of his working time Rnd
energy to managing and cultivating the orchard and vineyard
and all reeeipts therefrom being placed in a single bank
aceount· and all expenditures being made from such account,
the funds from that bank account that were used to pay for
[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Community Property, §§ 21, 22 j Am.Jur.,
Community Property (1st ed § 32).
Melt. Dig. References: [1, 2] Husband and Wife, § 58; [3, 4)
Depositions, §?:T.
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improvements to the laud must be apportioned between the
husband's separate property and the community property and
any increase in the value of the land attributable to the husband's efforts must be. allocated to community property to
determine what interest the deceased wife's sole devisee has
in the llmd.
[2] ld.-Community and Separate Property-Profits of Business.
-The part of the profits of a separate property enterprise
attributable to the husband's efforts is cOillluunity property,
whether the, ellterpri;;e be classified as "colllmercial" or
"agricul tural."
[3] Depositions-Use in Evidence-Admissibility.-Under Code
Civ. Proc., § 2030, subd. (b), providing that answers to interrogatories lllay be used to the sallle extent as provided in
Code Civ. Proc., § 2016, subd. (d), which provides for the use
of a p:lrty's depo~ition, by an adverse party for any purpose,
it was error to rule that defendants could not introduce into
evidence plaintiff's deposition and certain answers he gave to
interrogatories except to impeach his testimony; such deposition and answers to interrogatories, insofar as they contained
admissions, should have been admitted in evidence.
[4] ld.-Use in Evidence-Admissibility.-Since an adverse party's
deposition lllay be used to establish any material fact, a prima
facie case" or even to prove the whole case, a party is not
limited to using an adverse party's deposition or answers to
interrogatories for the purpose of impeaching his testimony.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Solano County. Harlow V. Greenwood, Judge. Reversed.
Action to quiet title to real property. Judgment for plaintiff reversed.
John J. Taheny for Defendants and Appellants.
Dobbins & Weir, Goodman & Goodman and Walter W. Weir
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff brought this action to quiet title
to 47 acres of land against Nanette La Rosa, the granddaughter and sole devisee of Hattie Mayhood, and against the
personal l'l'presentative of Mrs. Mayhood's estate. Plaintiff
acquired the land before his marriage to Mrs. M:ayhood in
1915. Mrs. Mayhood died in 1959. During the 44 years of
the marriage, the land was used to grow fruit trees and grape
vines. Until he became incapacitated by illness in 1957, plain-
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tiff devoted most of his working time and cnergy to managing
and cultivating the orchard and vineyard. All receipts therefrom were placed in a single bank account, and all expenditures were made from this account. Oue such expenditure, in
the amount of $12,000, was for a residence constructed on the
land in 1928. Defendants offered but were not allowed to
introduce evidence that another expenditure of $14,300 was
made in 1939 to replant the land with trees and grape vines.
The trial court, sitting without a jury, entered judgment
quieting plaintiff's title and denying the relief sought in
defendants' cross-complaint. Defendants appeal.
[1a] Defendants contend that the land was community
property to the extent that plaintiff's efforts increased its
value and funds used to improve it are attributable to his
efforts and that half of such community property therefore
passed to Mrs. La Rosa under the will. The trial court rejected
this contention on the authority of Estate of Pepper, 158 Cal.
619,623-624 [112 P. 62, 31 L.R.A. N.S. 1092].
[2] In Estate of Neilson, 57 Ca1.2d 733, 741 [22 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 371 P.2d 745], we overruled the Pepper case and held
that the part of the profits of a separate property enterprise
attributable to the husband's efforts is community property,
whether the enterprise be classified as "commercial" or "agricultural." [1 b] The funds in plaintiff's bank account
were derived primarily from profits of the enterprise. These
funds, which were used to pay for the improvements in 1928
and 1939, must therefore be apportioned between plaintiff's
separate property and the community property. Any increase
in the value of the land attributable to plaintiff's efforts was
also community property. (Estate of Neilson, supra, 57 Ca1.2d
at pp. 740-741.)
[3] Defendants also contend that the trial court erred
in ruling that they could not introduce into evidence plaintiff's
deposition and certain answers he gave to interrogatories
except to impeach his testimony. Code of Civil Procedure
section 2030, subdivision (b), provides that answers to interrogatorie!J "may be used to the same extent as provided in
subdivision (d) of Section 2016 of this code for the use of
the deposition of a party." Section 2016, subdivision (d),
paragraph (2), provides that, "so far as admissible under the
rules of evidence," any part or all of the deposition of a party
"may be used by an adverse party for any purpose." Thus,
insofar as plaintiff's deposition and answers to interrogatories
contained admissions, they should have been admitted in evi-
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dence. (Dini v. Dini, 188 Cal.App.2d 506, 512 [10 Cal.Rptr.
570] i Murry v. Manley, 170 Cal.App.2d 364, 367 [338 P.2d
976].) [4] As stated in the two cited cases, an adverse
party's deposition" may be used to establish any material fact,
a prima facie case, or even to prove the whole case." Consequently, a party is not limited to using an adverse party's
depositiou or answers to interrogatories for the purpose of
impeaching his testimony.
The judgment is reversed.
Gihson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., White, J.,
and Tobriner, J., concurred.

